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INTRODUCTION
This Essay is principally about economic policy. It high-
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lights the importance of competition policy and suggests that its
weight needs to be increased in the overall economic policy, and
specifically in some areas closely related to competition. The in-
creased weight principally means that the objectives of economic
policy as public values must be included in professional, political
and governmental decision-making. This is not driven by any
professional chauvinism, but rather by the political need of nec-
essary interest reconciliation and search for compromise. I also
sincerely believe that competition policy must be in the same
category as monetary, financial, or trade policy.
I. INTERNAL CHALLENGES TO COMPETITION POLICY
A. Basic Principles of Competition Policy
The competition policy of our days evolved in the past one
hundred years as a result of changes in the developed regions of
the world, and in these one hundred years controversies have
prevailed until this day. Still, some principles have become stan-
dard, and are not questioned any longer. Therefore, anyone
who wants to enforce a modern competition policy has to rely on
these recognized principles.
One such recognized principle says that competition policy
should protect competition itself, as competition embodies func-
tions conducive to economic and social development. In this
sense, competition policy acts against harmful anti-competitive
practices, such as cartels and abuses of dominant position, and
interferes with the structure of the economy if in the course of
purchasing companies, monopolization, and thus anti-competi-
tive practices, are attempted. This undisputed objective, how-
ever, is burdened with internal contradictions due to the fact
that the assessment of most anti-competitive practices is a com-
plex issue, and cannot be subordinated to any specific interest or
principle.
Another generally recognized competition policy objective
is the promotion of economic efficiency, which has been ana-
lyzed by various economic schools in different ways, some plac-
ing the emphasis on static efficiency, others on dynamic effi-
ciency, i.e., the innovative capabilities of the economy. The pur-
suit of this objective is especially important, and obviously results
in conflicts, if increased efficiency involves anti-competitive prac-
tices. In the modern world, exclusive agreements and concerted
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practices will necessarily evolve in the course of business, and
they may have anti-competitive effects, but they also contribute
to increased welfare. Therefore, in its day-to-day operation,
competition policy encounters the conflict between the two fun-
damental - undisputed - objectives, and we have to use our
discretion to find the best solution, socially and economically, at
any given time.
Behind the assessment of efficiency and its growth there is a
peculiar dispute known as "income allocation." The difference
is whether the surplus is retained by the producer or the con-
sumer. In the past decades, it became an accepted competition
policy principle that both the seller and the buyer have to get a
fair share of the surplus. This requirement in itself may intro-
duce enormous scope for disagreement into the implementation
of competition policy principles. The enforcement of the two
fundamental competition policy principles is burdened with ten-
sions in the area of natural monopolies, as there is no competi-
tion there to start with, and the desired effects of the two funda-
mental principles must be forced on the natural monopoly by
state regulations. In our situation the government plays several
roles, and therefore this problem is considerably more complex
than in the more developed world. In our case, the government
is the owner of the natural monopolies, but if it wants to sell its
property, it is interested in achieving favorable sales terms. The
government, however, is also forced to maximize budgetary reve-
nues, which results in hiking up the concession fees. On top of
all this, competition policy considerations must be enforced
through regulations ensuring strict and fair "income allocation."
Out of these three roles, competition policy is in conflict with
the other two, and obviously a compromise must be reached. As
the first two roles, however, involve Short term political aims,
which are easier to comprehend, it is most certainly the competi-
tion policy considerations that will be damaged. We have al-
ready encountered this problem; true, we have yet to create the
modem regulation of natural monopolies.
B. Additional Objectives
The implementation of economic policies in developed
countries as well as the social environment of the times forced
competition policy to increasingly incorporate so-called public
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interest functions in its objectives and practice. This is how the
protection of small businesses was adopted during the Depres-
sion, or fairness as a positive value of consumer societies in the
1960's and the 1970's. There are also examples of the use of
competition policy to curb inflation when the anti-inflationary
attempts of the government were opposed by monopolies and
monopolistic tendencies. Certain compromises, however, have
been needed for these "supplementary" objectives and values to
be able to coexist with the two fundamental objectives of compe-
tition policy, i.e., the protection of competition and the promo-
tion of efficiency. Such compromises generally mean that,
judged from competition policy grounds only, the fundamental
objectives are damaged, if the above-mentioned so-called social
objectives are included in the objectives. Competition policy,
however, could not turn a blind eye on social requirements, and
our days are increasingly characterized by a competition policy
with multiple objectives and natural compromises.
C. Judicial Transparency Versus Economic Contradictions
The competition policy conflict between the legal and eco-
nomic views presents another internal problem. Clearly the
above mentioned objectives of competition policy can be real-
ized only if they are protected, and if business practices contrary
to these objectives are prohibited or restricted. Laws are en-
acted for this purpose all over the world. Laws would always re-
quire the clear and unambiguous description of violations, but
the objectives themselves clearly indicate that in some cases this
is impossible, especially where the objectives of competition pol-
icy are in conflict with each other. Legal regulations generally
solve this problem by giving discretionary powers to decision-
makers in this area, and wherever discretionary powers exist,
there will be internal tensions in the judicial practice. It is also
clear that the more competition policy gives up the protection of
the so-called two fundamental principles, the more conflicts may
arise between the legal and economic views. This, however, is an
in-house problem for competition policy experts. We tend to
have good discussions and write articles about our different
views. We also know that there is a strict constraint in the en-
forcement of competition policy, namely that decisions have to
be made before a deadline. Practitioners in this area know how
seriously this internal conflict may be taken. Similar to devel-
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oped countries, our legal system ensures security in law in that
the decisions of the Office of Economic Competition, for in-
stance, can be challenged in court. We are aware that the court
faces the same challenges in its decisions as we do, and in spite
of the aforementioned internal problems the decisions of the
Competition Office and the Courts are mostly similar. The situa-
tion is similar in developed countries.
D. Theories of Competition
Several economic theories provided a basis for competition
policy. We can say that several schools of thought have evolved
in the past fifty years, the difference between them consisting in
the fundamental objective they consider competition policy
should protect, and the degree of intervention they consider
necessary to reach this objective. There are three schools that
are frequently mentioned in literature, and two other schools
represent the extreme views. The main tenets of the three most
important schools will be discussed here.
The first, the industrial policy and evolutionist school, takes
as its starting point that the competitive market structure of the
second half of the twentieth century is fundamentally different
from the nineteenth century capitalism, and in the present
globalized environment the competitive market of earlier times
is not only outdated but also impossible to enforce. The integra-
tion of government policies and the creation of globally compet-
itive firms is necessary to ensure social and economic welfare.
Therefore, competition policy fulfills its role if it helps domestic
firms to develop into firms of internationally competitive size in
the course of competition, and dismantles any obstacles to this
process.
The second, the so-called structuralist school, says that the
more concentrated the market structure, the less competition
exists. This school therefore considers justified any intervention
that eliminates artificial constraints to competition created by
firms. Such constraints are most often created on oligopolistic
markets, in the form of agreements between firms with large
market shares.
The third, the so-called Chicago school, developed mostly
on the basis of the criticism of the structuralist approach. This
school claims that the restriction of competition emphasized by
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the structuralists may evolve only in extreme cases, and it cannot
be maintained profitably in an open world. The only unques-
tionable objective of competition policy is economic efficiency,
and in most cases even the so-called anti-competitive practices,
except price fixing, improve efficiency, and thus increase con-
sumer welfare. Consequently, only minimal intervention can be
justified on competition policy grounds.
This oversimplified introduction serves the sole purpose of
highlighting the main points in the different approaches. Small
countries like Hungary most probably cannot, and should not,
follow any of the clear models, but I am not aware of any govern-
ments in developed countries, either, that would have commit-
ted themselves to one theory. There is good reason for this, as
theories and policies have their separate roles. The two should
not be mistaken for each other.
Furthermore, the economic theories that provide a "founda-
tion" for competition policy are primarily aimed at antitrust is-
sues, i.e., one part of competition policy, anti-competitive prac-
tices or agreements, abuse of dominant position and the control
of monopolistic concentrations, and do not deal with business
ethics, non-competitive environments, and the extraordinary
conditions of the "creation" of competition. Every school takes
the existence of private economy and competition for granted.
In our country, however, policies promoting the evolution of
competition are much more important in the transitory period,
and therefore competition policy is an issue for the whole gov-
ernment in this respect.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION POLICY
AND TRADE POLICY
A. Markets in Small Countries
It is often asked which is the most important tool or policy
that creates the conditions for competition or ensures its contin-
uation in a small country. This is not a rhetorical question, as
there is an important difference between small and large coun-
tries in terms of the fundamental factors determining the com-
petitive environment. One such difference is the size of markets
and its relationship to capacities. In the United States, for in-
stance, even in a concentrated industry, such as the aluminum
industry, the capacity of an optimum sized plan will cover only
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five to ten percent of the total domestic demand, whereas in a
small country the same capacity may produce several times the
demand on the domestic market. There are similar characteris-
tics in almost half of the economy under the conditions of mod-
em production.
In the modern, global world a small country, if it wants to
produce internationally competitive goods, often has no choice
but to facilitate the evolution of internationally optimum sized
firms on the domestic market, and at the same time to open up
the borders for competition from foreign firms. In Hungary's
markets, it is highly probable that only a few participants will
evolve relatively soon in about half the sectors, and in some areas
only a single producer may survive. This market structure will
emerge irrespective of any political or bureaucratic attempts on
the basis that any capital invested in the area will yield a return
only if the- firm is internationally competitive. Under these con-
ditions dominant firms and strict oligopolies must be considered
natural, and the only way to force them to compete is trade liber-
alization. This, however, may result in tensions.
B. What Are the Main Problems?
Within the tools of trade policy we can differentiate between
the elements representing administrative barriers to entry for
foreign competitors, licensing procedure, standards, quotas,
etc., and tools that do not raise direct administrative barriers but
make imports considerably more expensive or difficult. In ex-
treme cases the latter ones may eliminate competition alto-
gether, such as high tariffs.
Changing the so-called administrative methods in the first
category is in the discretionary power of any government. Natu-
rally, international agreements have a binding effect on us, re-
quiring clear liberalization of the present conditions, but if the
government wants to eliminate quotas or licensing procedures in
a given area earlier, it can do so at any time.
The situation is more complex with the elements in the sec-
ond category, as they include government regulations such as
customs proceedings, anti-dumping, or market protectionist
measures, as well as international agreements under which vol-
untary export or import restrictions are imposed. This category
also includes market access agreements concluded by the gov-
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emment, specifying, directly or indirectly, the volume of goods
and services in international trade.
Trade policy is disproportionately more important a com-
petitive condition for small countries than for large ones, and
therefore anything that trade policy may do to hinder, or pre-
vent, the access of foreign firms to the domestic market, or of
domestic firms to foreign markets, deserves special attention for
competition purposes. In simplified terms we can say that no
matter what barriers the tools of trade policy may raise against
the import or export of goods and services on the frontiers, the
consumers of the country will have to pay for them either in the
form of higher prices or higher taxes. This is not saying that the
legitimacy of trade policy should be questioned, but rather that
its tools should be put under competition policy control, and we
have to consider what we sacrifice with a given trade policy mea-
sure and why.
In the past five to six years, the Hungarian market has been
opened up to a great extent. This is clearly a benefit for the
creation of competition, and liberalization as an objective is fully
in line with the objectives of competition policy to protect com-
petition and promote efficiency. The elimination of trade policy
barriers will continue in accordance with our obligations under
international agreements, which is also favorable. Hopefully, a
modem, enforceable anti-dumping and market protection law,
in conformity with GATT, will also be soon enacted, which is an-
other laudable development.
There are only a few areas where competition policy contin-
ues to run into conflicts, where the principles of other policies
are damaged. I would like to highlight two "income allocation"
issues, the effects of the protectionism of firms dominant in their
business, and the so-called fiscal tariffs.
In order to be able to stand up for the promotion of effi-
ciency resulting from the existence and continuation of competi-
tion and the principle of fair allocation of income, competition
policy is especially opposed to trade policy barriers if there is a
dominant firm on a market.
Barriers to entry are especially objectionable if this is the
case in the whole vertical structure, e.g., a single vegetable oil
producer and a single margarine producer. In these cases, the
trade policy tools restricting market entry are harmful from the
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competition policy point of view because if the entry of foreign
firms is restricted with administrative measures, this may result
in the elimination of the need to improve efficiency. If market
access is restricted by high tariffs, these firms get extra profits
"unnecessarily." If both barriers exist, a very unequal income al-
location will result, and the consumers will suffer.
The other income allocation issue questionable from the
competition policy point of view is that of the so-called fiscal tar-
iffs. Tariffs are unquestionably fiscal if they are imposed on
goods not produced domestically. In these cases the tariffs do
not protect anyone, but only serve as a tax on imported goods.
The views of the two policies are different on this issue, although
there is an economic theory that combines the two nicely, and
sees no contradiction. In the objectives of trade policy these tar-
iffs play an important role, namely that they can be bargained
about at international negotiations and their reduction may be
tied to the reduction of tariffs other countries impose on our
goods. Competition policy, however, does not favor either, be-
cause in the course of trade negotiations these tariffs change
competitiveness without any regard to the efficiency of the sector
concerned. In Hungary the situation is further complicated by
the fact that due to the budget deficit the government is reluc-
tant to give up any "taxes" that people are already used to, thus
do not complain about.
C. Common Objectives
Despite their conflicts, competition policy and trade policy
can assist each other in reaching their objectives. Obviously the
GATT principles in trade policy, national treatment, most fa-
vored nation status and transparency, are in line with the objec-
tives of competition policy. It also works the other way around.
When competition policy measures are taken to maintain or pro-
tect domestic competition, help foreign investments and the ad-
aptation of new technologies, this also favors an open trade pol-
icy. Competition policy may help to transfer benefits from com-
petition to consumers even if these benefits arise from trade
liberalization or the related structural adaptation.
It is also clear that if competition policy fails to act sternly
against anti-competitive practices, it may also hinder trade policy
objectives. It is quite conceivable that trade policy has imple-
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mented liberalization. We expect increased efficiency as a re-
sult, but it is not realized due to anti-competitive practices.
Similarly we can talk about the shortcomings of trade policy
hindering the realization of competition policy goals. If, for in-
stance, transparency is missing, even the best competition policy
cannot make up for it. Or if interest groups or political forces
influence trade policy and divert it from its original objectives, it
will hinder competition policy in reaching its objectives. Trade
wars and market protectionist measures implemented as an over-
ture to them, or during their course, may lead to clearly anti-
competitive results. With trade policy measures governments
may create situations that are condemnable on competition pol-
icy grounds, but are impossible to contest with competition pol-
icy tools. Such situations may arise if companies reduce compe-
tition with voluntary export or import restrictions, and if there
are government agreements behind such restrictions, even more
developed countries refrain from competition control.
III. CONFLICT AREAS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND
COMPETITION POLICY
A. Different Principles
First of all, it should be noted that by industrial policy we
mean not only the government programs and responsibilities
concerning the manufacturing industry, but in international us-
age this term means a business or trade in the general sense of
the word. Thus it encompasses practically any activity. The is-
sues and conflicts between industrial policy and competition pol-
icy are similar to those outlined in connection with trade policy.
There are a few special features, however, that should be high-
lighted.
We talk about industrial policy if in a given trade, usually
pursuant to government decisions, the volume or composition
of investment allocation is different from what would result from
competitive market processes alone. This definition assumes
that industrial policy is a kind of interference into the processes
of competition and the market. We should note that in the de-
veloped world the politicians and trade circles that consider the
monolithic efficiency promotion-function of competition policy
important are less than enthusiastic about industrial policy mak-
ers claiming that any industrial policy measure is bound to result
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in lower overall efficiency that the implementation of the mono-
objective of competition policy would. In their opinion any in-
dustrial policy is against the public interest, as it reduces the to-
tal welfare in the economy, or in welfare economics jargoli, the
amount of the producers' and consumers' surplus.
B. Common Objectives
Therefore the issue is to reconcile the different considera-
tions of the two policies in a given country both in the short and
in the long term. We can define the range where competition
policy and industrial policy share the same goals, and the areas
where the objectives and thus the tools are different and lead to
conflicts. The overlapping area includes everything that consists
in the promotion of the so-called dynamic efficiency, i.e. if, in
order to improve international competitiveness, the industrial
policy of the government creates an innovative market and pro-
duction structure which does not make sacrifices in other areas,
the industrial policy will be in line with the goals of competition
policy. Typical examples include assistance to emerging indus-
tries, measures promoting or accelerating the utilization of the
results of scientific research, whether subsidies or competition
policy measures. Competition policy, for instance, while prose-
cuting anti-competitive practices, may exempt from the prohibi-
tion cartel certain anti-competitive agreements, such as exclusive
contracts, harmonization with intellectual property rights, etc.,
in order to promote the adaptation of the results of research and
the acceleration of development. The assumption is that the so-
cial and economic benefits of the exemption are greater than its
costs.
C. Potential Conflicts
Conflicts, however, do not arise from these issues, but arise
when altogether different interests appear in the field of indus-
trial policy, in the disguise of industrial policy.
One such traditional conflict arises when public funds are
invested in one sector under the auspices of industrial policy,
and it is clear that the sector in question will never be competi-
tive under a liberalized trade policy and a clear competition pol-
icy. Even in developed countries governments make such deci-
sions under very strong political pressures, and once the govern-
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ment has committed itself, it does not like to see trade policy or
competition policy endanger the implementation of its decision.
What generally happens in these instances is that trade pol-
icy constructs the walls on the frontiers that will protect the en-
terprise favored by the government decision from foreign com-
petition. As far as competition policy is concerned, it depends
on internal power relations whether it can take measures against
the industrial policy decision or it toes the line.
In this respect an interesting situation has emerged in Hun-
gary. On the one hand, the government has signed interna-
tional trade agreements, the EC Association Agreement, the free
trade agreement between the Visegrad countries and the agree-
ment with the EFTA countries, and is a member of GATT,
which, if complied with, allow very littde discretion for the gov-
ernment in its decisions. If the government were to find itself in
a situation where it had to violate international trade agreements
in order to implement an industrial policy decision, such a step
would not only damage the government's international reputa-
tion, but also hinder the county's integration. In this respect the
Hungarian economic policy decisions run a course which is dif-
ferent from most countries in the developed world, as some de-
veloped countries construct other policies mainly on the founda-
tion of industrial policy-type decisions, and the provisions of in-
ternational integrations and treaties have tried to place
restrictions on these afterwards.
Another special feature of the present situation in Hungary
is that even though the government has published a bulky vol-
ume on industrial policy concerning the manufacturing indus-
tries, which talks about many issues, it does not reveal in which
sectors, and from what date, will there be a different investment
allocation from what would emerge from competition. The in-
dustrial policy contains some commitment to crisis management,
and there are some preferences in privatization policy which are
relatively closely ,linked with investment allocation. Apart from
these, the industrial policy program is very smooth, thus it does
not indicate if there will be any conflicts with competition policy.
The so-called "industrial policy", concerning other sectors
can be summarized briefly as follows: Clear and declarative
ideas exist about telecommunications, some areas of transporta-
tion, road construction and the energy sector. This firm com-
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mitment, however, defines the objectives only, as the funding re-
quirement for the development of these areas exceeds HUF
2000 billion at present, and the sources for this financing are
unclear. In other words, this makes the investment allocation of
the definite program uncertain. The only exception may be tel-
ephone services, where the approved tariff regulations ensure
this, and in terms of agriculture, in the past four years no profes-
sional guidelines were prepared which would indicate allocation
commitments and potential conflicts with competition policy.
The situation, however, is rather unique, as the theoretically ef-
fective agricultural regime may be in conflict with competition
policy. In practice we have not had any conflicts as yet as the
agricultural regime has not been operational, but in reality, we
did have some conflicts in certain areas as the regime is not clear
enough.
D. Public Funds
Industrial policy decisions tend to have a dual nature. On
the one hand, whoever makes the decisions, generally the gov-
ernment, takes into consideration interests that a private owner
would not consider, or the order of priority of the decision-mak-
ing criteria is different, and on the other hand, the implementa-
tion generally involves government funding, which is nothing
but public funds, i.e. tax revenues or other benefits that are fi-
nanced from the budget which serves the purpose of the general
public good. In simplified terms we could say that industrial pol-
icy decisions should be assessed from the point of view of the use
of public funds, and we should condemn them only if we have
reason to do so because the way the money was spent distorted
the competition policy objectives or made them impossible.
The situation in Hungary has the following features. In the
past years the budgetary subsidies have considerably been re-
duced, even eliminated in many areas, which creates the impres-
sion that we have little to search for in this area. In accordance
with the provisions of the Act on Public Finances, earmarked
funds have been set up to provide government subsidies legally.
Even though these funds contain relatively little money to spend,
the association agreement with the European Communities re-
quires the Hungarian government to disclose the existing system
of subsidies, and to approximate them to the principles of the
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Treaty of Rome in the framework of defined rules and frame-
work. The principles of the Treaty of Rome "allow" or object to
government subsidies on the basis of competition policy assess-
ment, and in the course of decades the present situation evolved
where in the member states of the European Communities more
subsidies are given relative to the size of the economies than
what is available in Hungary from the existing resources. The
first review of the Hungarian system of subsidies will soon be
completed, therefore for the time being we cannot declare with-
out qualifications that our system of subsidies is in conformity
with the EC system.
In the present so-called transitory period we should call at-
tention to two factors related to the potential conflicts between
competition policy and government subsidies. One of them is
that a considerable proportion of the economy is exposed to a
degree of structural transformation and adaptation that it is
clearly unable to meet. This results in bankruptcies and liquida-
tions, which represent adaptation in the given circle of enter-
prises, even if as a result of drastic compulsions.
The other feature is related to debtor consolidation, which
program, in my opinion, is one of the most important economic
policy decisions in the past four years. It represents the view that
half of the economy cannot be rendered inoperative, because
this is not simply an economic, but rather a social policy issue.
Therefore this program requires sacrifices, which means the ex-
penditure of public money as well as the postponement of some
of the burdens to later times. The Hungarian government was
clearly forced to launch this program, and has a vested interest
in its success.
Competition-distorting public funds are not directly con-
nected to bankruptcies and liquidations, and if some public bur-
dens are indirectly still related, such as tax relief or unemploy-
ment benefits, the goal is to choose the solution requiring mini-
mum losses. Such funds raise no competition policy problems
on the whole, as they do not unilaterally favor one party in the
competition, or provide illegitimate advantages. Competition
policy is opposed to these two main types of government subsi-
dies.
The situation is more complex when we get to debtor con-
solidation as several forms of public funds may be involved, and
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as a result of the consolidation an artificial situation is necessar-
ily created. It is artificial in that the results are more related to
the past than to future competitiveness. Therefore the new start-
ing positions evolving through a series of individual decisions
will inevitably be different from the competition point of view,
and the objectives of competition policy are also likely to be
harmed. Still we have to say that this is a compromise competi-
tion policy has to make, because on the whole probably only the
worse solution could be chosen.. The micro and macro level as-
sessment and success of the debtor consolidation is considerably
different. In the micro-economic sense the most important cri-
terion of success is the proportion of the companies involved
that will get a real chance to make a new start. In the macro-
economic sense success means that the process does not have to
be repeated.
In this context we need to point out that our situation is
fundamentally different from the developed countries' in the
context of competition policy, but in periods when the most de-
veloped countries were in structural crisis, competition policy
principles were enforced only with many compromises. In devel-
oped countries the subsidization of small enterprises, for in-
stance, was incorporated into the goals of competition policy
during the structural crises. Still, governments made this deci-
sion, and rightly so, because they could solve much greater social
problems with it than without it. Therefore we have to say that
in the developed world we cannot point to a period when they
had a situation similar to the present Hungarian economic and
structural crisis, and still rigidly insisted on the exclusive enforce-
ment of the basic objectives of competition policy. This is also
only part of the truth. All I am trying to say is that in the objec-
tives of competition policy, and especially in the trade policies,
the type and structure of compromises are dictated by the given
social and economic environment.
IV. CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE
A. Trade and Competition Policy on International Fields
In the past decade, regionalization, the expansion of inte-
gration, and primarily the so-called globalization presented chal-
lenges to competition policy. If we look behind the surface of
these trends we can also notice that almost all the problems pres-
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ent on the international scene are represented in some manner
in the domestic competition policy. We can look at this relation-
ship from the other side, too, as we can talk about the interna-
tional reflection of the conflicts within national competition pol-
icies. The dilemmas are not new, but their concentration is, to-
gether with some issues coming to the foreground, others
pushed to the background. We should highlight three issues.
The international conflicts between trade policy and comlpeti-
tion policy. The harmonization attempts of competition policies
on the international level. And the reflection of the objective
differences between small and large countries in competition
policy in terms of influencing market structure.
As is known, international trade policy as we know it today
developed historically during the so-called GATT rounds since
1948. GATT achieved extraordinary successes in dismantling the
barriers between countries, the transformation of remaining bar-
riers into more liberal forms and the opening of markets. These
results greatly contributed to the development of the world, the
increase of competition and competitiveness, and the changes in
the welfare of countries participating in world trade. At the
same time from the mid 1960's it became increasingly apparent
that the economic cartels of private firms - and in certain cases
of countries - and the anti-competitive agreements of firms
have erected walls in front of international trade that in different
structures, with different income allocation and different inter-
ests partially compensated, in the competition policy sense, for
the barriers eliminated by GATT. This process is further compli-
cated by the ruthless competition between the large economic
regions of the world, namely the contest between the North
American region led by the United States, the European Union,
and the Far East led by Japan. Of course it would be naive to
believe that the anti-competitive practices of private firms are in-
dependent of government policies. What is more, if we were to
analyze the approximately three hundred agreements made in
the past thirty years which also represent restriction of competi-
tion, we would find that governments and significant business
circles have an interest in them. This contradiction and conflict
with competition policy became a significant factor in recent
years, because if we accept that governments have done their
best to promote world trade under GATT, it is rather strange
that they allowed the anti-competitive practices of private forms
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to widely develop. There are several possible answers to this
question. I would like to call your attention to the fact that by
the end of the century a system of international fora has to be
created for the solution of this dilemma. UNCTAD and GATT
have taken the initiative, and the Competition Policy Commis-
sion of OECD also plays an important part in analyzing problems
and setting potential tasks. It seems that by the end of the cen-
tury the leading economic powers will also have an interest in
setting up the institutions to handle competition policy on the
international level. This was proposed in 1947, and several times
subsequently, but it has not been completed until now. It is
clear, however, that the reconciliation of the interests of trade
policy and competition policy will not be an easy task. It will not
be easy because there will necessarily be parties favored by the
solutions, and others not so favored. Still, there is hope for coor-
dination as the firms of large economic areas have more and
more significant investments and interests in other economic ar-
eas, strategic alliances are becoming more widespread, and the
necessary coordination has to happen to insure peaceful eco-
nomic conquest. But the real issue is how the large regions can
reduce their own protectionism on the frontiers of the region or
within it, how they will allow access to each others market and
whether a sociopolitical environment will evolve within the re-
gions that considers this conducive to the public good. Nothing
has been decided in this respect yet, it is impossible to say how
long this process will take, but the important thing for us is that
we are likely to have an interest in actively monitoring such
processes and ensuring participation in every possible forum, as
the decisions may have a significant influence on our future.
B. International Challenges
Competition policy faces international challenges within its
own institution, the competition policies of different countries
are different in terms of their tools and severity. The require-
ment of harmonization has also been voiced on several occasions
and major results have been achieved since 1986. In the frame-
work of OECD member states have committed themselves to mu-
tually providing information and ensuring a certain degree of
coordination. The United States entered into an important
agreement on harmonization with the European Communities,
and similar agreements were made between the United States,
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Australia, and New Zealand. These agreements deal with aspects
of information exchange and enforcement issues creating better
conditions for possible harmonization of substantive law in the
future. In the background of professional disputes we find inter-
ests and principles rather than economic theories. If a govern-
ment, for instance, has sovereignly defined its own competition
policy, the question is to what extent it can, or should, give up its
sovereignty. The main professional dilemma is how to harmo-
nize competition policy in terms of its tools, information content
and the internal considerations for competition policy assess-
ment in a manner that is acceptable for an increasing number of
countries or regions, knowing that they are competitors and that
they want to beat each other in the race. I would also highlight
the fact that in addition to the negotiations of individual coun-
tries, by their government, the negotiations and agreements of
integrations and regions are becoming increasingly important.
All this underlines the importance of belonging to an integra-
tion in terms of competition policy.
C. Dilemmas of Small Countries
The solution of the small country versus large country di-
lemma is important for us. It is especially important as we are
going to become part of a real integration in the future, and it
matters a great deal if we manage to implement the structural
changes in the transitory period with the minimum problems
possible. As a small country cannot attempt to produce every-
thing, inevitably we will increasingly take part in international
trade. It is also inevitable, however, that we have to produce
goods competitive on international markets with modern capaci-
ties and economies of scale. We can safely say that in the short
term we will not have a domestic firm that originates in Hun-
gary, gains market shares and grows into a multinational com-
pany. Therefore the solution is that the companies that can po-
tentially produce such goods become part of multinational firms
and strategic alliances that have already achieved dominance on
the globalized market. I do not want to exaggerate the impor-
tance of this issue. The example of small developed countries
indicates that a significant proportion of their GDP, and espe-
cially their exports, comes from such activities. It is also clear
that even if we achieve some success in this respect, in the short
term the majority of our exports will not consist of such prod-
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ucts. This is because as a small country, we have to stay on the
market, or gain access to new markets, which requires additional
expenditure. If we had such competitive edge as to cover these
expenditures from it we would not be where we are now. The
more likely scenario is that we have to undertake an additional
burden with what is mostly competitive disadvantage. As a result
of our situation and the small size of the country this burden is
so large that it will damage welfare. The real pitfall is failure to
realize the problem, or pretending it does not exist.
One may ask why this dilemma is related to competition pol-
icy, and why it has international connotations. It is competition-
related because the more seriously we take efficiency as a funda-
mental objective of competition policy, the more we have to live
with the integration that will facilitate efficient production and
may happen quickly in the future, as well as the resulting oligop-
oly structures or dominant positions. The dilemma is whether
when assessing mergers we will be able to clearly see if the
merger is necessary for international competitiveness and effi-
ciency, and will allow them even if we foresee that they will have
anti-competitive effects. The years when the internal goals of
competition policy will conflict with each other are ahead of us.
Naturally we cannot predict how strong the internal capital con-
centration process will be, or whether the mergers will be of the
conglomerate type, or vertical or horizontal concentrations.
The issue is of international importance because the initia-
tors of concentrations will be multinational or partly foreign-
owned firms, which obviously have an interest in conquering the
Hungarian market. If competitiveness does not change signifi-
cantly, the economic balance may be significantly endangered,
which will be an absolute obstacle to our joining the European
Union. The conflicts between competition policy assessment
and the complex set of objectives cannot stayiwithin the frontiers
as there is, or will be, foreign interest in every major case.
CONCLUSION
In Article 9 of the Hungarian Constitution, the Republic of
Hungary recognizes and supports the right to enterprise and the
freedom of economic competition. Article 9 states:
(1) The economy of the Republic is a market economy in
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which public and private property shall be equally respected
and granted equal protection.
(2) The Republic of Hungary shall acknowledge and pro-
mote the right to free enterprise and the freedom of eco-
nomic competition.'
The change of regime that took place in Hungary in 1990
potentially gave a new substance and form to the operation of
the economy. This mainly appears in the facts that parliamen-
tary democracy was called into being within an extremely short
time in a peaceful way and the governments which have entered
office since then committed themselves to create and operate a
market economy. Within this framework shaping a relatively up-
to-date competition policy and establishing legal instruments
and institutions which could serve the enforcement of this policy
- for the first time in Hungary's history - became possible.
The main message of this Essay can be summarized as follows:
First, during the formulation and implementation of com-
petition policy in practice all those essential contradictions and
conflict zones can be perceived that were to be observed in the
countries of the developed world during the last decades. With
the motives of contradictions included in the system itself this is
true, even if in a given period the laws and government policies
containing the aims and tools of competition policy strive to pro-
vide transparency. Generally recognized competition policy
objectives are the promotion of economic efficiency and protec-
tion of the competition itself. In the modern world, exclusive
agreements and concerted practices will necessarily evolve in
business, and they have anticompetitive effects,' but they also
contribute to increased welfare. Therefore, competition policy
encounters the conflict between the two fundamental - undis-
puted - objectives, and we have to use our discretion to find
the best solution, socially and economically, at any given time.
Second, for such a small and open-economy country as
Hungary, trade policy plays a remarkable role in the operation
of market and competition. The relatively fast liberalization in
the trade policy of the country put an end to the so-called econ-
omy of scarcity that was characteristic of the previous regime but
contributed also to the manifestation of uncompetitiveness. As a
consequence, several companies became bankrupt and this re-
1. HUNG. CONST. (AcL No. 20 of 1949, wording effective Oct. 7, 1994) art. 9(1)-(2).
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suited in significant structural changes that have brought about
the shaping of lobbies that are fighting for protectionism. Any-
thing that trade policy may do to hinder, or prevent, the access
of foreign markets, deserves special attention for competition
purposes.
Third, in Hungary there is no room for a competition policy
with industrial policy preferences because the government first
of all has no money for industrial policy preferences. The avail-
able sources are devoted practically to settling the problems
caused by the structural crisis and in this sense they play a passive
role from the point of view of industrial policy and an almost
neutral one in relation to competition policy.
Fourth, impacts of the worldwide accelerated globalization
are significant in Hungary as well, because competition policy
faces various international challenges. Maybe the most impor-
tant issue in this field is that private businesses gaining ground
rapidly, together with the globalization processes, have launched
a kind of new concentration wave in this country, and in a sub-
stantial part of the economy markets characterized by dominant
positions respectively strict oligopoly structures are being devel-
oped, as a rule. In my view this process is inevitable because
Hungary's efforts for the integration and the need for creating
competitiveness support this structural transformation.
Finally, this study highlights the importance of competition
policy and suggests that its weight needs to be increased in the
overall economic policy, specifically in some areas closely related
to competition. The objectives of economic policy as public val-
ues must be included in professional, political and governmental
decision-making.
